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Radical embodied cognitive neuroscience (RECN) will probably rely on dynamical systems
theory (DST) and complex systems theory for methods and formalism. Yet, there have
been plenty of non-radical neurodynamicists out there for quite some time. How much of
their work fits with radical embodied cognitive science, what do they need RECN for, and
what are the inconsistencies between RECN and established neurodynamics that would
have to be resolved? This paper is both theoretical hypothesis and review. First, it provides
a brief overview of the typical, purely structural considerations why the central nervous
systems (CNS) should be treated as a nonlinear dynamical system and what this entails.
The reader will learn about the circular causality enclosing brain and behavior and different
attempts to formalize this circularity. Then, three different attempts at linking dynamics
and theory of brain function are described in more detail and criticized. A fourth method
based on ecological psychology could fix some of the issues that the others encounter. It is
argued that studying self-organization of the brain without taking its ecological embedding
into account is insufficient. Finally, based on existing theoretical work we propose two
roles that the CNS has to be fulfilling in order to allow an animal to behave adequately
in its niche. In its first role the CNS has to be enslaved easily by patterns of behavior
that guide the animal through its environment. In the second role the brain has to flexibly
switch among patterns, what can be called the metastable circuit breaker. The relevance
of this idea is supported using certain motor symptoms of Parkinson’s disease (PD). These
symptoms can be explained as consequent to an excessive stability of the (metastable)
circuit breaker.
Keywords: cognitive neuroscience, neurodynamics, metastability, embodiment, ecological psychology, enactivism,
synergetics, dynamical disease
PRELIMINARIES
Embodied approaches to cognition comprise some of the most
interesting and fresh developments in the cognitive sciences in the
past two decades (Brooks, 1991; Varela et al., 1991; Chiel and Beer,
1997; Clark, 1997; Anderson, 2003). The field at large, however,
failed to use its momentum in order to completely dispose of
certain intransigent issues such as the representational nature of
cognitive architectures. This led to what was seen as the need for a
radical embodied cognitive science based on the joint theoretical
and methodological footing of dynamical systems theory (DST)
and ecological psychology (Chemero, 2009).
The present issue dedicated to the topic of radical embodied
cognitive neuroscience (RECN) is positioned on a comparable
trajectory. Brain is the object of scientific scrutiny receiving by
far the most attention and funding1 nowadays, at least in the
1An American Decade of the Brain was proclaimed in 1990 by the then head
of state and last year another Decade of the Brain was proclaimed. In Europe,
a notable example of the gold rush for scientific facts that brain research
represents is the industrial-scale Human Brain Project (Markram et al., 2011)
set to benefit from funding so ample that it requires scientific notation to
express.
mind and behavior sciences. Most of this research is directed at
investigating how the brain implements a putative formal symbol
manipulation system while an embodied approach would most
likely argue that the brain engages dynamically, not symbolically
with a field spanning also the body and its environment (see
Chemero, 2009; Barrett, 2011; Wilson and Golonka, 2013). In
the nooks and crannies of the extensive neurosciences one can
find research programs that would fit comfortably under the
embodied/embedded/enactive/situated or dynamical designation.
An inconclusive list of these programs will be presented below
along with an evaluation of their deeper theoretical commit-
ments, or lack thereof, in the context of traditional issues in
cognitive science and perception.
The main goal of the present article, however, is to anticipate
a particular issue that RECN will face, an issue that is of critical
importance. Spelled succinctly, the problem is that RECN cannot
claim uniquely to itself the mathematical theories of nonlinear
dynamical systems and complexity that it will most likely use
to define its modus operandi; these have been deeply rooted
in the neurosciences for decades. Radical embodied cognitive
neuroscience cannot be a brand new paradigm in a Kuhnian sense
unless it can explain why it is the proper theoretical backdrop
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for DST and self-organization in the neurosciences. Notice that
this is a very different objective from the one that the dynamical
perspective in the cognitive sciences (van Gelder, 1998) had to
accomplish. There, the goal was to argue for the replacement of
computational metaphor and tools with dynamical ones. Here,
dynamics has been introduced long time ago, even helped neu-
roscience earn a Nobel prize, and multiple prophets can claim
authority. Accordingly, the objective is not so much to bring
dynamics to cognitive neuroscience as to motivate a neurodynam-
ics that is more ecological, less isolated in the head. In particular,
RECN needs to negotiate with three types of neurodynamicists
who benefit from a rich track record. We will designate these
as: (a) psychology- and philosophy-agnostic methodological neu-
rodynamicists; (b) computational Bayesian prediction neurody-
namicists; and (c) neo-Gestaltist neurodynamicists.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section The Brain as a
Dynamical System the case for dynamics and self-organization
in the neurosciences is defended briefly. In Section Breeds of
Neurodynamicists the reader is introduced to some of the extant
traditions by way of a gallery consisting of four cases studies. This
survey also serves to reinforce the point that dynamics and self-
organization have not necessarily always led everyone to consider
a radical theoretical stance, at least not overtly. Aguilera et al.
(2013) correctly remark that with few exceptions, their studies
using simulated agents being among them, neurodynamical work
tends to treat the brain in isolation and in this way ignores
the richer dynamics that one would expect in fully coupled
sensorimotor and environment systems. More importantly, these
richer dynamics are not merely more interesting but they can be
shown to serve as solutions to problems the real animals face. In
Section Dynamics in the Brain is Not Enough. Self-Organization
Occurs at the Ecological Scale the claim is presented that dynamics
and self-organization of the brain cannot even be understood
without also taking an ecological perspective into account. To
modify without permission a popular adage from the earlier
days of the ecological movement, in order to understand what
happens inside the brain one has to understand what the brain is
inside (Mace, 1977). Ashby (1962) definition of self-organization
proves very useful in supporting this argument more formally.
Section What is the CNS for? proposes two positive ideas about
the roles that the dynamical brain could be fulfilling. First, the
brain has a propensity to fall into a slave mode where behavior
and the environment take the lead. Second, the brain relies on
metastability to flexibly switch between different slave modes.
Two clarification notes about the style and scope of the present
article are necessary. The first one is about the usage of specialized
concepts. This is a theoretical review and it is beyond the means
of the present paper to define and explain the terminology. There
will be some mathematical terminology but no actual math.
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with basic concepts
in DST, mathematical and physical self-organizing systems, and
complexity. It is also beyond the means of the paper to decide
which of the many strands in DST, self-organizing systems and
complex systems is most appropriate for RECN. Anyone who
has ventured into the world of complexity knows that it is a
wild jungle that is growing much faster than it is being mapped.
There is only one way to be linear but there are many ways to be
non-linear. This complicates our task. Yet, a greedy approach is
going to be assumed here and all of these strands will be lumped
together and referred to collectively and equivalently either as
DST, dynamics, nonlinear sciences, sciences of self-organization, or
complexity. Where possible, the meaning of a given concept will
be constrained implicitly by including a reference to a key figure.
So, “complexity” means one general thing but complex systems
(Haken, 1988) and complex systems (Rosen, 1991) mean slightly
different things.2 Finally, a radically interdisciplinary approach
is assumed, one that does not respect the boundaries between
scientific domains. The reader should be prepared to move from
neuroscience, to an applied mathematics domain, and then to
old-time cognitive science and psychology (the ones that did not
care so much about the brain) in consecutive sentences without
being warned. Such is the reality of modern complexity sciences.
Second, in terms of range of animal capacities concerned, it
would be perfectly satisfactory if the hypotheses plausibly apply
to an agent perceiving its environment and acting appropriately
to find food and avoid danger, but not much more. Consider
the functional capacities of a lizard. The study of consciousness,
purposeful behavior, language, reasoning, imagery, etc., will have
to be put for later. This is important to keep in mind for some of
the claims and hypotheses to be introduced below could appear
very unintuitive.
An explanation of what movement has to do with the brain
is paramount. Llinás (2001) argues that the control of movement
is the prime evolutionary driving force in the development and
perfection of the brain. To illustrate the case, he tells the story of
the sea squirt that moves around in the water and once it finds
a spot with favorable conditions where it can plant itself and not
move for the rest of its life it eats its brain. The ecological approach
has been maintaining all along that movement and action func-
tionality is fundamental in the greater scheme of the entirety of
the human capacities (Michaels and Carello, 1981; Turvey et al.,
1981; Turvey and Shaw, 1995). Thankfully, mainstream neuro-
scientists, in the sensorimotor domain at least, are beginning to
realize this as well (Cisek, 2007; Wolpert, 2011). For the purposes
of the present paper movement is understood not merely as the
efficient displacement of a limb from point A to point B, but as
action—the real-time control of movement that is intentional3
with respect to a perceived affordance in the environment.
THE BRAIN AS A DYNAMICAL SYSTEM
STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES
The term neurodynamics can be used to designate the study of
brain as a dynamical system (Atmanspacher and Rotter, 2008).
The argument that the brain has to be considered first of all as
a dynamical system (Kelso, 1995; van Gelder, 1998) must have
been made a great number of times. What are the most obvious
2Both approaches are discussed further down the pages. As an example of how
the two might differ in an important way, Haken’s conception of complexity
tends to be more structural whereas Rosen’s is a more functional. The former
focuses on the circular causal connections between parts and wholes, between
microscopic and macroscopic levels of description of systems, be it physical
or biological. The latter focuses on the closed causal relations among the
functions of an organism.
3Motor comportment has its own intentionality (Kelly, 2002).
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reasons why the brain must be dynamical? To begin with, the
brain possesses all the characteristics of dynamical systems, and
many of these make no sense in human-built computers as we
know them nowadays. Not to bore the reader, only a simple
list follows here. First, the brain is massively distributed and
parallel. In this sense it resembles a high-dimensional network.
Network is what one calls a dynamical system when it starts
having many degrees of freedom. The brain is nonlinear in at
least two different ways: the response of at least some neurons to
pre-synaptic potentials is a nonlinear (sigmoid) function and the
brain is full of feedback loops, instantiating a recurrent network.
A neuron is an analog machine because even the slightest pre-
synaptic activity changes the distance of the neuron state from
the action potential threshold. Hence, the brain is a real-time
continuous-state4 recurrent network. The spreading of activation
takes time. Dynamical systems theory has delay equations for that.
Like everything in biology, neurons too are messy; they do not run
on ideal trajectories like machined mechanical devices. Whether
one should call this stochastic dynamics or chaos is not so clear yet
but there are dynamics for both types. To conclude, the brain is a
continuous state high-dimensional recurrent nonlinear stochastic
and/or chaotic dynamical system, among other things. A Turing
machine is neither of these.
COORDINATION DYNAMICS
The brain is known to exhibit some patently dynamical phenom-
ena which are treated collectively as coordination dynamics (Kelso,
1995). One such phenomenon, a phase-transition from anti-
phase to in-phase phase-locked mode of coordination between
coupled oscillators, has been observed in the cortex (Fuchs et al.,
1992). Further investigation revealed a range of more subtle
dynamical regimes such as multi- and meta-stability (see also
Section What is the CNS for?) in addition to simple phase-locking
(Kelso, 2012; Kelso et al., 2013; Tognoli and Kelso, 2014). The
entrainment of spontaneously oscillating units covers a whole
range of phenomena in the brain (Buzsaki, 2006).
The emergence of macro-scale temporal-spatial patterns due
to micro-scale activity is a typical nonlinear dynamical phe-
nomenon. Even more specific to self-organizing systems, in some
cases it can be shown analytically that the macro-scale patterns
(indexed by way of so-called order parameters) control the activ-
ity of their own constitutive micro-scale substrate (Haken, 1978,
1988). The method of explaining brain function in terms of
order parameters is a signature of synergetics and is of central
importance for RECN.
THE SLAVING PRINCIPLE: COLLECTIVE VARIABLES RUN THE SHOW
To grasp the gist of the present article, one has to understand
the notions of collective variable, order parameter, and the slaving
principle. The technical term that Haken uses for low-dimensional
patterns emerging at the level of collective behavior is order
parameter. Reduction of dimensionality is an essential marker
of self-organization. The notions of order parameter and col-
lective variable are extended from their usual application to
4If it is analog then it can also be regarded as digital if it needs be, but the other
way around does not work.
quantities used in “simple” physical systems (i.e., a homogeneous
substance). These quantities serve to define the state of the system
in terms of how constrained the individual atoms are by the other
atoms. For example, the given order parameter in a gas is equal
to 0 because the atoms move independently from each other
whereas in the solid state of the same substance the parameter
is a positive number because the atoms are ordered by being
rigidly coordinated with each other. What is special about an
appropriately selected order parameter is that it must clearly
index the change of state of the substance. When one cools the
substance to turn it into liquid and then solid state it is said to
go through phase-transitions at the critical points and at exactly
those points the order parameter exhibits a discontinuous jump.
To use another popular example, a ferromagnet suddenly switches
from being magnetized to not magnetized along with a gradual
increase of temperature and this sudden switch in the property
of magnetization is accompanied by a sudden shift in the order
parameter describing the alignment of the elementary atomic
magnets called spins. In the former case the spins are aligned, in
the latter case they point in random directions. The arrangement
happens spontaneously and globally through a sort of escalating
positive feedback that passes via the macroscopic variable—the
order parameter.
Part of the program of Haken’s synergetics is to show rig-
orously that exactly the same mechanism explains a range of
phenomena at any scale of nature, including the brain, where mul-
tiple interconnected units of behavior assembled into an open,
nonequilibrium system enter into a cooperative collective mode
of action. Arguably, the spontaneous synchronization among
neurons in a section of neural tissue obeys the same abstract prin-
ciples. This has been shown in some cases where the theory and
analytical methods of the physics of open, nonequilibrium sys-
tems were applied rigorously and a detailed quantitative account
of the empirical phenomenon at the meso-scale (phase-transition
in the cortical wave dynamics recorded during a coordination
dynamics task involving an oscillatory acoustic stimulus and
oscillatory motor behavior) was obtained based on the properties
of the micro-scale substrate and the acoustic stimulus (Jirsa and
Haken, 1996).
Strogatz (2003), another prominent proponent of such uni-
versal principles for spontaneous synchronization, surveyed the
development of the Kuramoto model. It is one of the most
well-studied mathematical formalisms for collective cooperative
behavior mediated by synchronization. There, an array of coupled
oscillators spontaneously synchronizes and the effect is shown to
be mediated by a variable defined at the collective level (Strogatz,
2000). This formalism has been applied to cortical waves (Frank
et al., 2000).
To get a better appreciation of how an order parameter might
exercise top-down influence on the elements constituting the
collective, consider the following revealing example offered by
Hofstadter (2007). Think about driving a car on an open highway.
You have several degrees of freedom: speed, lane, stopping on
the side, etc. As the traffic gets denser, you start to be more
constrained but still you are the master of your journey within the
constraints. You will arrive at different times depending on how
aggressively you drive. Beyond a certain critical density of cars,
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however, a traffic jam becomes inevitable. Then all cars start and
stop as the traffic jam permits them. You creep forward in discrete
jumps and how fast you accelerate within these brief periods
does not affect the overall speed with which you will traverse the
jammed area. You have lost your degrees of freedom to the traffic
pattern. Yet, the traffic pattern is but the movement of the cars on
the road!
BREEDS OF NEURODYNAMICISTS
A comprehensive review of all branches of neurodynamics would
require a series of papers. For this reason, this part of the paper
is limited only to identifying three important types of research
programs classified on the basis of how they treat certain classical
issues in perception. Furthermore, each class is introduced by way
of a case study mostly focusing on an important paper or person.
A fourth program, one that typically would not be recognized as
neurodynamical, suggests a solution to some of the problems that
the other three encounter.
CASE STUDY 1: THE PSYCHOLOGY- AND PHILOSOPHY-AGNOSTIC
NEURODYNAMICISTS
A report in the journal Science by Kaschube et al. (2010)
introduced an ambitious empirical and modeling study on the
morphology of orientation columns within the visual cortex of
three species. The particular combination of species is interesting
because they evolved the same topology independently; the same-
ness is not due to shared genetic lineage. The main finding is that
only certain abstract principles of self-organization (embodied in
a particular order parameter field model), not genetic lineage nor
environmental pressure during development (because even dark-
reared animals developed the same structure), could account for
the convergence in topology. The authors’ job is commendable for
achieving not only qualitative (similar pattern of arrangement of
orientation preference in the real and simulated tissue) but also
quantitative agreement. Quantitative instead of merely qualitative
agreement in the practice of dynamical modeling of biological
or behavioral processes is a difficult task that can rarely be
fully accomplished. In short, the study embodies several positive
features that a dynamically oriented RECN aspires for.
To put the reader in context, the model that was used was a ver-
sion of a Swift-Hohenberg equation, a spatial pattern formation
system. It evolves in time and two spatial dimensions and makes
spirals, hexagons, stripes, pinwheels, etc., sometimes called Turing
patterns. It has been used to study chaos in the Rayleigh-Bénard
convection instability (Cross et al., 1994) and associative memory
as pattern completion (Frank, 2012). It belongs to a larger family
(Hutt, 2007) including the reaction-diffusion equations. These
were pioneered by Turing (1952) and can model many other real-
world systems such as, for example, chemical oscillators (Haken,
1978) and neural fields (Hutt, 2007). This family of systems is
a good representative of what many a dynamicist dream for:
an explanation in an abstract form that applies in an universal
fashion to phenomena in many different domains of science.
Unfortunately, after having taken advantage of the power
of self-organization to explain a natural phenomenon at the
intersection of biology and perception, Kaschube et al. (2010)
fail to recognize a problem in treating the tissue as symbolic
in its interaction with the rest of the brain. Self-organization
at the developmental scale explains the local topology of the
columns but formal symbol manipulation explains how they
function within the greater context of perception: they represent
to the rest of the brain a particular feature of the external world
(p. 1114). This instance of “piecewise” self-organization is
remarkable and disappointing at the same time. Notice that
the particular pattern of arrangement is not even essential for
perception; not all mammals have the same range of patterns (i.e.,
pinwheels) of arrangement of the columns. On the other hand,
the really important questions such as what drives the functional
organization of these columns, how features of different modal-
ities are integrated given that they are treated by separate dumb
and functionally specialized modules, i.e., how the rest of the
brain gets to know that column A means 45◦ and column B means
−45◦, how the rest of the brain knows that this 45◦ is to be applied
to figure C and this −45◦ to figure D are not deemed a worthy
issue. It is as if you own a space ship but only use it to freight small
packages around town. Accordingly, an important task for an
aspiring RECN is to show that it is not a trivial thing to superim-
pose dynamical and symbolic frameworks and to steer the atten-
tion of fellow neurodynamicists to the really important questions.
Parallel to that, a crucial task for the established neurodynamicist
would be to show that a the mixing up of dynamics and symbolic
computation does not necessarily lead to a contradiction.
With his model of pattern formation on the coat of certain
animals (chemical morphogenesis) Turing (1952) pioneered a
whole new brand of computation, different from the computation
performed by the Turing machine. Cooper (2012a) calls it embod-
ied computation5 and argues that Turing did not venture into it
out of mere curiosity but understood the difficulties with Turing
computation. Unfortunately, he did not have time to complete his
more recent quest. Also, he did not have time to explain what the
reaction-diffusion formalism has to do with the functional role
of the skin patterns (to serve as disguise from prey or predators)
and with the theory of natural selection. The study on orientation
column ordering seems to follow the same trajectory.
CASE STUDY 2: BAYESIAN PREDICTIVE NEURODYNAMICS
In a large review paper Clark (2013) introduces us to a yet
another new wave of cognitive science. It is the science of the
Bayesian predictive brain. Some other aspects of Clark’s vision
are intriguing. Imagine the human as fundamentally temporal all
the way down to the design principles of her perceptual system;
her existence is defined in terms of her future, a future made of
action possibilities. This sounds like it could have come from any
enactivist (Varela et al., 1991), phenomenology-inspired (Kelly,
2002; Rietveld, 2008), or in some cases even Gibsonian (Turvey,
1992; Stoffregen, 2000) ontology of perception. Maybe Clark got
the ontology right?
5Cooper (2012a,b,c) explains that the original formulation of computation is
not adequate when applied to the real world; work on the theory of computa-
tion did not complete in the 1940’s. Supposedly, Turing would have agreed to
that; part of the motivation behind his work on chemical morphogenesis was
to create a biologically-relevant theory of computation. Anyone who believes
that the brain does Turing computation or that emergent patterns are Turing-
machine phenomena should think again.
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Clark also brings a Karl Friston angle to the framework and
this is what makes it dynamical and interesting within the goals
of the current Topic. Friston (2010; Friston et al., 2010) enriches
the Bayesian statistical framework with self-organization driven
by a concretely defined potential function. The dimension of the
potential function is free energy but it is really just the prediction
error quantified not by way of variance but by way of entropy.6
The predictive brain, then, is a machine that likes to build models
of the sensory input and probabilistically evaluates it while the
error drives the movement. The ultimate goal of the model is that
it is in resonance with the upcoming sensory stimulation at any
point in time.
Trying to take Von Helmholtz’ ideas–cognition as hypothesis
making and testing–and squeeze them in perception7 is both-
ersome. Leaving aside that small problem of abduction (Fodor,
2001) that no one knows how to solve, the tricky part is that
predicting the future movement in terms of hypothesis testing
means that the agent’s brain spends most of its time deal-
ing not with action possibilities but with action impossibilities
(bad hypotheses)! Lots of them have to be filtered out first.
In realistic circumstances the set of options is always open,
and then each possibility might lead to a dead end one step
further. To be functional in a real world one has to be sensi-
tive to context (Rietveld, 2012a,b). Context-sensitivity is non-
locality but computation is local. Maybe in restricted domains
the Bayesian predictive brain can brute-force its way from pre-
dicting perceptions to predicting movements and actions and
vice versa. But it is not so clear whether the framework can
scale up from simple laboratory tasks to the real world. Finally,
Clark’s paper does not make it very clear how predictions over
movement and predictions over perception in the brain are
to be integrated, which is essential if the two are to work
together.
Yet, we should not make a big fuss about the predictive
Bayesian brain. The reason why is that maybe a lot about the
project is correct and some troublesome details can be reinter-
preted. Before we explain how, first consider what an ecological
theory of being directed at the impending future could look
like (Stepp and Turvey, 2010). Described very cursory, strong
anticipation (Dubois, 2001, 2003) deals with the ability of chaotic
dynamical systems to synchronize with other systems, to do so
in an anticipatory manner when the coupling has a delay, and to
maintain the synchronized trajectory some time after the coupling
is removed. In very few words, statistical prediction is replaced
with dynamical anticipation.
Social scientists like to look for differences between theories;
mathematicians like to look for similarities. What is similar
between the predictive Bayesian brain and strong anticipation?
First, on a purely semantic level, prediction and anticipation
mean the same thing. They might point to diverging imple-
mentations, but how diverging? Entropy-based measures of
6Entropy is another measure of variability, but with a fancy sounding name.
Given that Gaussian assumptions are made in a few places in the model,
could it be that variance would have worked just as well as an entropy-based
measure?
7Making Helmholtz sound Gibsonian must be a fun activity!
de-synchronization can be used for coupled dynamical systems8
(Tass et al., 1998; Pikovsky et al., 2003) and entropy-based mea-
sures are used for prediction error (Friston, 2010). This means
that the entropy in the Friston model could be just a measure
of asynchrony or lack of entrainment. Accordingly, a relevant
hypothesis is that minimizing free energy in Friston’s formalism is
the same as minimizing phase mismatch between coupled systems
in strong synchronization.
CASE STUDY 3: NEOGESTALT NEURODYNAMICISTS
OF NONEQUILIBRIUM THERMODYNAMICS
Ask a Gestalt psychologist the following question, Why does one
perceive X? The response would be, Because the neural tissue
organized itself into an X following a gradient towards equilib-
rium in the tissue. Gestalt theory of perception was a theory of
the brain as a system self-organizing after the principles of equi-
librium thermodynamics (Stadler and Kruse, 1990). Back then
they could imagine how self-organization is at play in the cortex.
They could not imagine how the same principles could apply
simultaneously across brain, body, and environment. Interest-
ingly, the brain-body-environment is the field in which Merleau-
Ponty wanted to embed the perceiver in order to fix Gestalt
psychology. Dreyfus (1996, 2007) calls it a body-environment
gestalt. For example, while one is playing tennis, “a gestalt is made
up from the court, one’s running opponent, and the oncoming
ball” (Dreyfus, 1996).
Grounding the Gestalt project in the brain failed but, one
would say, maybe the failure was not due to bad theory but
to bad analytical methods; there was no nonlinear dynamics at
the time and no nonequilibrium thermodynamics (Stadler and
Kruse, 1990). Modern theories of nonequilibrium systems such
as synergetics make it possible to give Gestalt neurodynamics
another try. “The order-parameter are ultimately the thoughts”
(Haken, 1978, p. 15) where what is meant by order-parameter is
strictly based on neural activation. This is the point where Haken
and his followers made a mistake.
By moving up the imaginary scale from brain and behavior
to “mind” one crosses into a completely different realm. The dis-
tinction (between macro-scale “mind” and meso-scale “brain”) is
not merely of scale but also of metaphysical dimension. It is not
the same sort of distinction as the one between laser substrate
and laser beam (coherent lasing mode, one of Haken’s proper
examples of order parameters enslaving a substrate). A philoso-
pher would protest against the cavalier way in which a old and
difficult problem is being solved in just one sentence by attaching
the word “mind” to the pattern of a neural field. In addition to
being poorly motivated, the idea of treating mental content as
the upper-most and ultimate macro-scale pattern faces the risk
of slipping into a solipsist theory of perception and consciousness.
A careful read of Haken and his followers reveals that to the extent
8Take two independent uncoupled oscillators freely running at different
frequencies. The relative phase between them goes everywhere and as you
sample it eventually it will fill a flat distribution spanning the whole range.
Such a distribution will give you the most entropy you can get for the given
amount of sampling. On the contrary, any sort of synchronization, even if it is
transient, will produce some inhomogeneity in the relative phase distribution
which will reduce its entropy.
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that they can explain phenomena such as multistable perception
and “formation of meaning”, they rarely make use of anything
outside of the brain to do so (Kruse and Stadler, 1995).
CASE STUDY 4: ECOLOGICAL EXTENSION OF SYNERGETICS
An ecological interpretation can save Haken’s approach. It would
do so by properly finding the place of the presumed supra-brain
order-parameter dynamics not in an abstract substance of mind
but at the level of the agent-environment (physical) system. The
latter is of the same metaphysical kind as brain and body, just
larger. Over the years, the so-called neo-Gibsonians have been
developing a collection of primitives for theories of perception,
action, and motor control. These primitives are selected to be
congruent with the physics of the real world at the animal scale,
what they called ecological physics (Gibson, 1960), and also
with the physics of nonequilibrium systems (Kugler et al., 1980;
Shaw et al., 1982; Kugler and Turvey, 1987). Although such an
ecological re-interpretation with an eye on brain dynamics has
never been attempted, the framework has been applied fruitfully
at the behavioral level (Warren, 1984; Warren and Wang, 1987;
Carello et al., 1992; van der Kamp et al., 1998; van Rooij et al.,
2002; Richardson et al., 2007; Frank et al., 2009, 2010; Lopresti-
Goodman et al., 2011, 2013; Dotov, 2013). To do so, one takes
a strictly top-down approach assuming that a given pattern of
perception and action performed by a participant in a given
experimental setting is described by an order parameter and the
order parameter dynamics along with phase transitions and other
nonlinear phenomena are modeled mathematically.
A good synthesis of the ecological and synergetic theory is
provided by Warren (2006). In his schematic, the dynamics of
perception and action consist of a closed loop that couples agent
dynamics and environment dynamics. In the one direction the
coupling consist of a mapping from body movement to forces
acting on the environment. In the other direction, the coupling
consists of an optic (or else) array specifying the state of envi-
ronment relative to the agent. All of this makes a dynamic field
embedding multiple parts (eyes, musculoskeletal system, nervous
tissue, ground, surfaces, light reflected from those surfaces, optic
flow, and all the rest). The emergence of an order parameter
(a behavioral dynamic pattern), i.e., a certain type of movement
of the agent across the environment, means that the parts as a
collective have entered a collaborative mode. This mode is indexed
by a given order parameter. The behavior enslaves the parts and
the parts support the behavior. With respect to a special role, if
any, that the brain could be playing in this schema, see Section
What is the CNS for? below.
If one can make sense of this reconceptualization of the way the
parts of the body serve behavior, one will discover that it leads to
a range of unintuitive realizations. First, an agent does not think
the behavior, prepare the pattern, and then perform it. Instead,
the behavior grabs the agent because the suitable conditions
happened to occur (Shaw et al., 1982). A necessary member of
these conditions is that a match exists between abilities of the
agent and affordances of the environment, also known as duality
of constraint between animal and environment (Shaw and Turvey,
1981). Second, the sequence of involvement of the parts does not
necessarily have to be fixed for a given behavioral pattern to be
initiated. For instance, a given pattern does not have to always
start from the environment-to-agent coupling, or from within the
agent’s brain. In some cases an agent might even find itself on the
phase space trajectory of a given pattern completely accidentally.
I might realize that I can get my cup of coffee sitting on the other
side of the room and then initiate a walking behavior to displace
myself towards the coffee or I might find myself walking in the
appropriate direction for some other reason and then realize that
I can get some coffee. From which direction in phase space one
approaches a given limit set is not important as long as one gets
close enough to the attractive domain. Similarly, some parts will
be critical for a given pattern whereas others are replaceable. The
behavior, being a nonlinear dynamic pattern, possesses certain
resistance to perturbation.
IN CONCLUSION
Is there a systematic way of distinguishing among the four flavors
of neurodynamicists mentioned so far given that they all talk
about the same thing—dynamical systems? One can ask the
questions, What is the system? and, What are the parameters? The
flavors then can be classified based on the answers. The four types
of design, following the case studies in respective order are as
such.
I. The brain is the system. It also stores its own parameters.
It runs a hybrid of continuous dynamics enclosed in boxes
that are themselves embedded in sequential formal symbol
manipulation.
II. The brain is the system. It also stores its own parameters,
adjusting them to better match a guess about the external
world. In addition to being dynamical, and symbolic, it is also
an abduction machine.
III. The brain is the system. It is a fully self-organizing system
and is self-contained. The environment provides a control
parameter that is defined independently from the animal and
in this sense is linearly separable.
IV. The system is the dynamical field spanning the brain, body,
and environment. The brain, being the most flexible and
adaptive part, serves to interrupt a given field or complete
different fields spanning subsets of the full range of possible
configurations of the environment and the body.
DYNAMICS IN THE BRAIN IS NOT ENOUGH.
SELF-ORGANIZATION OCCURS AT THE ECOLOGICAL SCALE
If one is convinced that the dynamical approach is anti-
reductionist, one would be disappointed to find out that non-
linear dynamics in itself does not preclude reductionist thinking.
The idea behind reductionism is that higher-order properties
can be obtained deductively from lower-order properties. Is not
the Human Brain Project (Markram et al., 2011) the ultimate
reductionist Laplacian dream? The simulations specify cellular
parameters (molecular ones will come in the next years), runs a
sequence of deductive operations on a Turing machine (a very
long sequence indeed), and hopes to understand human behavior,
perception, thinking, etc. In the core of these operations one
finds the equations of motion approximating in computer dis-
crete time nonlinear dynamical models such as reaction-diffusion
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equations, the Hodgkin–Huxley model (see Section Case Study 1:
The psychology- and Philosophy-Agnostic Neurodynamicists for
a discussion of the significance of such models).
A radical claim would be that we actually already know most
of what we need to know about the brain, there is no hidden
neural code to be decoded. Among the successes of the Blue
Brain Project (precursor to the Human Brain Project and a big
endeavor in its own right) after painstakingly detailed dynami-
cal modeling of neuronal cortical columns one finds emergent
properties at the collective level of the full column (Markram
et al., 2011) such as propagating waves of synchronous activa-
tion. Interestingly, the same can be achieved using a relatively
small system of dynamical equations running on your laptop,
not on a supercomputer (Izhikevich, 2007). The point is not to
disparage the achievements of the project. On the contrary, if
propagating waves and such were among the main results of the
project, they would serve to confirm an important hypothesis.
The hypothesis is that neural tissue in itself does not exhibit
much more than spontaneous synchronization and other phe-
nomena typical of nonlinear dynamical systems.9 Augmenting
the size of the simulation and taking larger and larger chunks of
tissue is not going to change that, contrary to von Neumann’s
(1966) hypothesis that a critical number of parts exists past
which an automaton becomes self-complicating, the “thresh-
old of complexity” idea. The interesting behavior appears when
the tissue is embedded into what it has been evolved to be
embedded into—a field of environmental and bodily activity—
implying that the proper unit of analysis includes brain, body, and
its niche.
To develop further the case of embedding the brain through
the body into a niche, consider Ashby’s (1962, originally
published 1962) notion of self-organization. His argument
appears similar to the one developed here. First, he makes a dis-
tinction between organization in a purely structural sense and the
normative quality attributed to the organization. The former is
the state S defined by the parts of the system arranged in a certain
coordinated pattern and possessing certain resilience to pertur-
bation (nowadays we would call that arrangement an attractor);
the latter cannot be evaluated without reference to the embedding
environment. As per the (self-)organization of S, Ashby points
out that networks can rewire themselves spontaneously and grow
in structure but this notion does not address the normative
side. For a system to be truly self-organizing in the normative
sense, it would have to be able to redefine the way it responds
to certain conditions when necessary. To use Ashby’s honestly
cybernetic example of an instance of self-organization in struc-
ture and function, a child who is a fire-seeking system changes
to a fire-avoiding system once having experienced the burn of
the flame.
Ashby’s demonstrated that self-organization of a system (i.e., a
brain) without considering its environment does not make sense.
9Of course the brain performs special work by, for instance, transforming
the optical array dimensionally so that the muscles can accept it Pellionisz
(1986). But this is different from the sequential information processing usually
assumed. Here we are only going to discuss the global property of connecting
and breaking the behavioral field.
This is a strong argument against the sort of neurodynamics that
only consider dynamics in the head as the source of behavior.
Consider his thoughts further. If f (the behavior) is the mapping
from state (of the brain) S to a new state S, the purpose of learning
is to change the mapping f. For example, let si be a state (of the
brain) when the agent is located near the fire, sj—a state when
touching the fire, and sk—a state away from the fire. If f mapped
S from si to sj before learning but si to sk after learning, then
conceptualizing learning as self-organization implies that f is also
a function of S. For Ashby, however, this simply cannot occur for
formal reasons; you cannot even write it in mathematical form.
For clarity, imagine that f can exist in two different forms, fa and
fb. Each of these functions maps S onto S in some particular way.
For self-organization to occur, S has to determine which of the
fa or fb is being used. This could only be made sense of formally
if another system α having fa and fb as its states is included and S
and α are taken to be mutually causing. Thus, Ashby (p. 117) con-
cludes, “the appearance of being “self-organizing” can be given
only by the machine S being coupled to another machine . . .” and
“the part S can be ‘self-organizing’ within the whole S+ α”.
Ashby puts quotation marks around “self-organizing”. He
advises against the use of the expression because it leads to
confusion. He probably felt that sacrificing the proper delineation
of “system” and “environment” is too high a price to pay for a
logically consistent understanding of self-organization. From an
ecological perspective, however, agent-environment systems are
a proper unit of analysis and blurring the boundary between
the two can even be fruitful (Dotov et al., 2010). A sequence of
theories of the (formal) mutuality of agent and environment, or
environment property and agent property can be traced over the
years (Shaw et al., 1982; Turvey, 1992; Chemero and Turvey, 2007,
2008).
Where Ashby stopped is where theoretical biologist Robert
Rosen began (Rosen, 1991), trying to tackle the apparent self-
causing nature of living systems. While Rosen’s understanding
of complexity is far less popular nowadays than the different
breeds of computational, dynamical, and statistical complexity,
he might actually be on the right track. He was one of the few
who grabbed the bull by the horns and directly addressed the
functional complexity of living systems (good self-organization, in
Ashby’s terms). In contrast, notions such as Shannon entropy,
dimension, relative phase, coherence, scaling exponent, and a
plethora of other mathematical quantities typically used in the
characterization of complex systems all refer to structure or the
evolution of structure in time, at best, but not to function. Only
Haken’s (1988, Jirsa and Haken, 1996) notion of circular causality
(the slaving principle) comes closer to Rosen’s ideas. For a modern
application of Rosen’s theory to perceptual systems, see Chemero
and Turvey (2007, 2008). It is very likely that something like
Rosen’s discussion of closure to efficient cause, similar in spirit
to the enactivist autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela, 1980), could
shed light on how behavior in an environment shapes the brain
which in its turn shapes behavior. Nowadays, Ashby’s sort of
S+ α self-organization is being applied for the purposes of testing
theory by way of simulated agents and for further exploring the
capacities of artificial systems (Buckley et al., 2008; Santos et al.,
2012; Aguilera et al., 2013; Buhrmann et al., 2013).
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WHAT IS THE CNS FOR?
BRAIN AS THE SLAVE TO THE ANIMAL-ENVIRONMENT SYSTEM
The idea that the brain is a physical substrate the microscopic
elements of which are being enslaved by a higher-order pattern
was introduced in Section The Brain as a Dynamical System.
In Section Breeds of Neurodynamicists it was claimed that the
slaving can come at play down from the level of behavior in an
environment. In this sense, the brain, as the thing that sits between
most sense organs and the muscles, has to be enslaved by a
higher-order dynamic pattern for motor behavior to occur and be
sustained. As a further illustration, consider the blue collar brain
hypothesis (Van Orden et al., 2012). It rests on the suggestion that
since the time scales of body and environment are slower than
the time scales of the brain (but see, Turvey and Fonseca, 2014),
the latter must be controlled, in the sense of be constrained, by
the former.
This line of thinking is consistent with Fuchs (2011) under-
standing of the brain as a (very large) set of latent open loops.
In given circumstances one of the loops will be closed, and thus
selected out of the larger set, by a given configuration of the
body and environment. He calls these open loops dispositions.
Accordingly, the main job of the brain, at least in the context of
on-line control of movement, tracking danger and prey, etc., is
merely to close the circuit of a given dynamical field spanning a
configuration of brain, agent, and environment. The important
point is that selection of a given loop, which minimally corre-
sponds to a specific mapping from sense organs to muscles, has
to happen and the responsibility for this selection is offloaded to
the animal-environment system.
THE METASTABLE CIRCUIT BREAKER
The claim in the previous section was that an essential aspect
of the functionality of the brain is to allow itself to be enslaved
by a dynamic field spanning the animal and its surroundings.
Evidently, in a changing environment this would lead to trou-
ble sooner or later. To avoid becoming locked in a potentially
unfavorable mode of behavior, the brain has to be sensitive
simultaneously to multiple threats and opportunities in the envi-
ronment and switch among them. But what sort of property
is that? It seems to be a paradoxical requirement in terms of
DST. Merely decreasing stability is not satisfactory. In order
for the agent to possess behavioral stability the order param-
eter needs to sit on an attractor. In order to quickly switch,
it needs to sit on a repeller, or change attractors frequently.
Such a hypothetical regime where the system seems to occupy
multiple points in phase-space simultaneously has been labeled
metastability.
There have been several different proposed formalisms that are
to embody the desired metastable property of the brain. One that
conveys the idea well is cast in terms of a parametric configuration
that keeps the order parameter dynamics a little past the loss of an
attractor (Kelso and Engstrøm, 2006; Kelso and Tognoli, 2009).
Alternatively, controllable chaotic dynamics (Hübler and Lüscher,
1989) could implement the desired characteristics more liter-
ally (Freeman and Barrie, 1994). Other proposals rely on more
complicated systems that use a mechanism of self-suppression or
mutual suppression or topology without attractors. This type of
dynamic has been called winner-less competition (Milton, 2000;
Rabinovich et al., 2010) or transient or metastable dynamic
(Friston, 1997, 2000).
CLINICAL RELEVANCE. LOSS OF THE METASTABILITY
PROPERTY IN PARKINSON’S DISEASE (PD)
What would cognitive neuroscience be without discussion of
diseases? Maybe RECN can provide an original explanation
of at least one of symptom of PD. The relevant facts are as
follows. The disease is associated with the progressive loss of
dopamine producing cells in the substantia nigra of the basal
ganglia. Various motor symptoms advance early in the disease
and involve a reduced ability to initiate movements and to stop
them once they have been initiated (akinesia), stiffness of the
muscles, slowness of movements (bradykinesia), rigid ineffec-
tive postural control, uncontrollable spontaneous movements
(hyperkinesia), tremor, and freezing (Grabli et al., 2012). Akinesia
earlier in the progression of the disease leads to difficulty in
initiating a movement or a locomotory mode while the form
of the movement itself might be unaffected. This implies that
the patients might be capable of satisfactory gait and posture
maintenance but switching among these locomotory modes, i.e.,
from walking to standing and from standing to walking, is
problematic.
Akinesia is not an issue of preferential selectivity for one
type of behavior over another because the symptoms can be
symmetric–switching is hard either way.
This symptomatic description suggests that maybe the disease
can be considered as a dynamical disease (Glass and Mackey, 1988;
Milton, 2000) in that it is based on an alteration of a dynamical
regime, in this case the metastable switching among behavioral
patterns. In particular, the two behaviors seen as attractive regions
in phase space are accessible by the patient but destabilizing the
one in order to switch to the other is problematic. Interestingly,
cuing helps patients initiate movements and in this way allows
patients to prolong their independence. Cuing can consist of audi-
tory or visual signals that provide structure in the environment
that is easy to coordinate with, such as repetitive lines on the
ground, the light of a laser pointer that one has to follow, or
repetitive auditory stimuli (Velik et al., 2012; Young et al., 2014).
In other words, the so-called cuing techniques provide structure
that affords synchronization and coordination. Accordingly, the
patients use this repetitive structure to prompt themselves to
initiate movement (Grabli et al., 2012).
The “broken metastable circuit breaker” interpretation of the
particular PD symptoms is consistent with the supposed role
of the basal ganglia, the place where PD strikes. The healthy
basal ganglia is involved in selecting and inhibiting different
potential actions (Mink, 1996; Cisek, 2007; Cisek and Kalaska,
2010). The claim that this selection process is dynamical in
nature is supported more specifically by a recent line of work
showing that motor symptoms of PD are associated with exag-
gerated synchronization within the basal ganglia (Brown, 2007;
Chen et al., 2007; Tass et al., 2012; Brittain et al., 2013).
Excessive synchronization means excessive dynamical stability
and is the opposite of metastability (Kelso, 2012; Tognoli and
Kelso, 2014).
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CONCLUSION
An important objective of RECN is to motivate a neurodynamics
that is more ecological, less isolated in the head (Section Pre-
liminaries). The initial steps offered here involve Ashby’s log-
ical argument of what self-organization might mean (Section
Dynamics in the Brain is not Enough. Self-Organization Occurs
at the Ecological Scale) and some untoward consequences from
failing to realize the importance of the environment (Section
Breeds of Neurodynamicists). How a dynamic field spanning both
the animal and its environment (an animal-environment gestalt)
could lead to functional behavior on the side of the animal was
suggested in Sections The Slaving Principle: Collective Variables
Run the Show, Case Study 4: Ecological Extension of Synergetics,
and What is the CNS for? The slaving principle and the notion
of order parameter, backed by the analytical tools and theory of
synergetics, serve to give more rigorous footing to the idea that
macroscopic order at the level of behavior can dictate the meso-
scopic and microscopic activity of brain regions and neurons.
An example of clinically relevant dysfunctional enslavement (loss
of flexibility and context-sensitivity) of the brain was given in
Section What is the CNS for?
The present article achieves its goals mostly by reviewing
already existent theories and fitting them together. In fact, it might
be fully consistent with Kelso’s long-term project of extending the
relevance of coordination dynamics (see Section Coordination
Dynamics) and synergetics (see Section The Slaving Principle:
Collective Variables Run the Show) to brain function (Tognoli
et al., 2007; Kelso, 2012; Tognoli and Kelso, 2014). The only
important difference is to be found in the degree to which the
hypothesis presented in the current article pursues the implica-
tion that the top-most order parameter is a behavioral pattern in
the animal-environment system, not a neural field. Contrary to
some of Kelso’s work (Kelso et al., 2013), an argument was present
on the previous pages (see Section Case Study 3: NeoGestalt Neu-
rodynamicists of Nonequilibrium Thermodynamics and Dynam-
ics in the Brain is not Enough. Self-Organization Occurs at the
Ecological Scale) in favor of the former.
Some 20 years ago, in defining the notion of the organism-
environment system, Järvilehto (1998) suggested that a number of
problems faced by modern psychology and neuroscience could be
due to the very assumption of two separate systems. He pointed
out that the two-systems assumption in psychology was largely
due to pre-scientific common-sense intuition: our experience
with the world seems to suggest a very strong dualism between
inside the head and outside the head. He proposed that all
functional behavior should be regarded as internal reorganization
of the elements of the unitary organism-environment system. The
specific role of neurons is not to process the stimulus but to have
been organized already in such a way that the stimulus would
complete a given behavioral pattern leading to desirable results
(compare to dispositions and open loops in Section Brain as the
Slave to the Animal-Environment System).
Jordan (2008) wild-agents continue in the vein of organism-
environment systems in that they always already embody their
own developmental context. Furthermore, his wild systems the-
ory provides a detailed list of characteristics that organisms
must possess in order to be capable of independent agency.
Among them, the strongly nested architecture consisting of
quasi-independent self-sustaining units at each level is important
because it offers an avenue for thinking about the fact that in most
organisms behavior happens as reorganization on a large range of
scales in parallel, from neuron to animal-environment system.
The current work has implications for at least one standing
question. The extended mind and extended cognition hypothe-
ses maintain that cognition is massively distributed beyond the
body (McClamrock, 1995; Wilson, 1995; Clark, 1997). Cognitive
functions encompass not only multiple and flexibly connected
brain regions (see the work inspired by the neural reuse and
massive redeployment hypotheses, Anderson, 2007, 2010) but also
body parts and slices of the environment (Anderson et al., 2012).
A difficult question follows, however. How do all these various
parts come together to work in unity for the purpose of solving
a given problem? Very different configurations will be required
for different tasks or for the same task performed under different
conditions.
Part of the answer invokes notions such as soft-assembly,
interaction-dominant dynamics, and task-specific synergies
(Anderson et al., 2012; see also the notion of coalitions, Shaw and
Turvey, 1981). The problem is that while these demonstrate how
such spontaneous self-assembly of distributed cognitive devices
is possible and make some very rough predictions about the
statistical properties of measurements taken from these devices
(Van Orden et al., 2003), they do little to explain exactly what
drives the self-assembly. Spontaneous order is not sufficient for
functional organization. “Good” self-organization occurs in the
agent-environment system, as Ashby (1962) already pointed out
half a century ago (see Section Dynamics in the Brain is not
Enough. Self-Organization Occurs at the Ecological Scale). On
the other hand, the schematic offered in the present article (see
Sections The Slaving Principle: Collective Variables Run the Show,
Case Study 4: Ecological Extension of Synergetics, and What is
the CNS for?), that of an order parameter defined over a dynamic
field spanning the agent and its surroundings and enslaving the
components, could be pointing to a solution to this problem.
An interesting question arises when one considers a situation
where the role of environment for an agent is played by another
agent. It is beyond the means of the present article, however, to
discuss the growing field of social coordination dynamics. It is
sufficient to point that studies seeking to determine the neural
dimensions of emergent agent-agent systems are beginning to
appear (see, Iizuka and Ikegami, 2003; Tognoli et al., 2007; Dumas
et al., 2010).
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